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Concept,

and the universal as it is now envisaged is truly concrete, in the

following respects:

1. It is not merely a property, in the sense of being a way an individual may

be: rather, it is what the individual is, in so far as that individual is an

instance of that kind of thing; it is therefore a substance universal (e.g.

‘man’ or ‘rose’) and not a property universal (e.g. ‘red’ or ‘tall’).

2. It supports generic propositions, such as statements of natural law (‘human

beings are rational agents’) and normative statements (‘because this person

is irrational, he is a poor example of a human being’); these are therefore

to be distinguished from universally quantiﬁed statements (‘all human

beings have earlobes’, ‘all swans are white’), which tell us abo ut the shared

characteristics of a group of individuals, rather than the characteristics

of the kind to which the individuals belong (men qua men are rational).

determinate, something particularized. But ‘to be animal,’ the kind considered as the

universal, pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate

essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is.

Things as such have a persisting, inner nature, and an external thereness. They live and

die, come to be and pass away; their essentiality, their universality, is the kind, and this

cannot be interpreted merely as something held in common.

(. . . wenn wir von einem bestimmten Tiere sprechen, wir sagen, es sei Tier. Das Tier als

solches ist nicht zu zeigen, sondern nur immer ein bestimmtes. Das Tier existert nicht,

sondern ist die allgemeine Natur der einzelnen Tiere, und jedes existierende Tier ist ein

viel konkreter Bestimmtes, ein Besondertes. Aber Tier zu sein, die Gattung als des

Allgemeine, geho

rt dem bestimmten Tier an und macht seine bestimmte Wesentlich-

keit aus. Nehmen wir das Tiersein vom Hunde weg, so ware nich zu sagen, was er sei.

Die Dinge u

berhaupt haben eine bleibende, innere Natur und ein a

ußerliches Dasein.

Sie leben und sterben, entstehen und vergehen; ihre Wesentlichkeit, ihre Allgemeinheit

ist die Gattung, und diese ist nicht bloß als ein Gemeinschaftliches aufzufassen.)

(Werke, Vol. VIII, p. 82)

Cf. ibid., x177 Addition, p. 255: ‘it is the Concept that forms the content of the judgement

henceforth’ [‘und [der Begriﬀ] ist es, welcher nunmehr den Inhalt des Urteils bildet’, Werke, Vol.

VIII, p. 330].

Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, x456 Addition, p. 209, where Hegel distinguishes the genus as a

concrete universal, from the particular properties of the individual:

This common element is either any one particular side of the object raised to the form

of universality, such as, for example, in the rose, the red colour; or the concrete

universal, the genus, for example, in the rose, the plant.

(Dies Gemeinsame ist entweder irgendeine in die Form der Allgemeinheit erhobene

besondere Seite des Gegenstandes, wie z. B. an der Rose die rote Farbe, oder das

konkret Allgemeine,dieGattung, z. B. an der Rose die Pﬂanze.)

(Werke, Vol. X, p. 266)

Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, 649–50:

[With the judgement of necessity] The subject has thus stripped oﬀ the form

determination of the judgement of reﬂection which passed from this through some to

allness; instead of all men we now have to say man ...What belongs to all the

individuals of a genus belongs to the genus by its nature, is an immediate consequence

and the expression of what we have seen, that the subject, for example all men, strips

oﬀ its form determination, and man is to take its place. This intrinsic and explicit

connection constitutes the basis of a new judgement, the judgement of necessity.

130 ROBERT STERN

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